




Institutional design is the choice of rules for 
collective decision-making. At the moment 
of designing institutions, two main questions 
have to be addressed: who is entitled to par-
ticipate? and how will decisions be made? 
The first question points to the design of the 
community. Collective decisions can be 
enforceable if people within some bounda-
ries think or accept they share enough with 
the others to abide by the outcomes, even if 
they find themselves to be losers or in a 
minority on some issues, or if the costs of not 
complying are too high. The Western 
European model of nation-state building has 
been too often taken as the only reference 
and interesting path for building a political 
community. Political science is still very 
state-centered. However, recent and current 
developments, in both Europe and the rest of 
the world, demand for a more diversified 
menu, as we will discuss in the following 
pages. The second question – how decisions 
are made – implies at least to major issues: 
what can be decided on each occasion, which 
refers to how decision powers are divided 
among different bodies or branches of gov-
ernment, and how people’s preferences are 
transformed into collective outcomes, which 
basically involves choices on voting and 
electoral rules. Many years ago, David Hume 
advised institutional designers with these 
words:
In contriving any system of government, and fixing 
the several checks and controls of the constitution, 
every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to 
have no other end, in all his actions, but private 
interest. By this interest we must govern him and, 
by means of it, make him cooperate to public 
good, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and 
ambition. (Hume, 1741 [1994]).
In this chapter we will prove that the assump-
tion that people seek their own interest not 
only in making private or public policy deci-
sions, but also when choosing the institu-
tional rules for making those decisions, is 
broadly shared and analytically fruitful. 
Institutional designers, while tending to 
deploy their ‘ambition’, often aim at putting 
levers of rule at their easy disposal in order to 
concentrate, rather than check power. 
However, an efficient institutional design – 
that is, one making rulers ‘cooperate to 
public good’, in Hume’s terms – can result 
from circumstances in which no actor has 
sufficient influence to impose its own project 
and diverse ambitions counterweight each 
other. Not surprisingly, this is a relatively 
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frequent situation in a complex world, which 
may explain why major institutional choices 
are increasingly made in favour of formulas 
able to produce power-sharing and to satisfy 
broad groups of people, which is just another 
way to refer to ‘public good’.
The following review shows that, in the cur-
rent world, the number of small, sufficiently 
homogeneous communities to make consen-
sual and enforceable collective decisions is 
increasing; the number of democracies is also 
increasing; institutional choices tend to favour 
division of powers rather than concentration in 
a single body or party; and electoral rules are 
increasingly chosen to permit multiple parties 
to participate and share government. As actors’ 
self-interested behaviour leads to broadly effi-
cient and satisfactory institutional choices, it 
seems that a kind of ‘invisible hand’ in the 
field can be identified – actually in a not very 
dissimilar way as a pattern of unintended con-
sequences for private decisions was also iden-
tified by Adam Smith, in truth David Hume’s 
favourite disciple.
The chapter is divided in two parts. In the 
first, the problems of building a community 
are addressed with the help of the categories 
of ‘state’, ‘nation’ and ‘empire’. In the second 
part, we review the state of the art regard-
ing the choice of institutional rules for divi-
sion of powers and elections. A few remarks 
conclude.
COMMUNITY-BUILDING
The design of institutions may involve the 
building of a large nation-state under the 
modern West European model. But it may 
entail the building of other types of community, 
such as ‘empires’ or ‘cities’, as very large and 
small communities, respectively, were called in 
classical studies in the field. After having lost 
the ‘state’ and brought it back in, a more diver-
sified categorization of polities or structures of 
governments is opening its way in recent 
political studies.
Decline and failure of the 
sovereign state
About a generation ago, a claim was made to 
‘bring the state back in’ the social sciences, 
as in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and 
Theda Skocpol (1985) and, especially, 
Skocpol (1985). This claim was initially 
addressed to correct ‘too society-centered’ 
ways of explaining politics and governmen-
tal processes that had prevailed during a 
previous period starting in the 1950s and 
1960s. Bringing the ‘state’ back in brought 
about much more attention to formal rules 
and institutions, governmental activities, and 
the impact of authorities on societal proc-
esses, including economic interests and social 
movements. New knowledge and science 
have indeed developed from that impulse and 
the subsequent turn in methodological 
approaches.
However, in a number of further scholarly 
studies, the ‘state’ was conceived not only as 
an institutional and organizational structure 
for different actor’s strategies and decisions, 
but as a unitary actor, especially in the field 
of international or transnational relations. 
The ‘explanatory centrality’ given to the state 
as a potent and autonomous actor somehow 
neglected the role of both larger and smaller 
political units, especially as the scale of poli-
tics has been changing during the most recent 
period.
The promoters of the newly ‘state-centered’ 
approach remarked that it derived in part from 
analytical developments and problems in pre-
vious ‘society-centered’ approaches, since the 
explanation of many societal processes 
required to ascertain the impact of the political 
system and the state itself. Analogously, the 
development of studies directly or indirectly 
inspired on the assumption of state centrality 
has contributed to pay attention to alternative 
political units with an impact on states. In 
recent times scholars of the state have realized 
that the state cannot be taken for granted; its 
very existence is problematic; processes of 
state-building and nation-building show that 
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there are different degrees of ‘statehood’ or 
‘stateness’; there are strong and weak states, 
as well as numerous failed ‘states’; and the 
future of the national state in the current world 
is questioned by new issues of scale, space 
and territoriality.
‘State’ is in fact a category that has become 
decreasingly able to account for many poli-
ties in the current world. Apparently, the cur-
rent world is organized in almost 200 ‘states’. 
But only a relatively limited number of these 
political units can be considered to be suc-
cessful ‘states’ in a strict sense of the word. 
Sovereign states succeeded in Europe within 
a historical period that began about 300 years 
ago and is today essentially finished. In fact 
the Western European model of state has 
either not been applied or has mostly failed 
elsewhere in the world. Now, as a conse-
quence of the creation, successive enlarge-
ments and strengthening of the European 
Union, the validity of the traditional Western 
European model of sovereign nation-state 
has weakened further because it is in decline 
even in the original experience.
Elsewhere, the Western European model of 
the sovereign state has been much less suc-
cessful. The US was created from the begin-
ning, rather than as a nation-state, as a 
‘compound republic’ formed by previously 
existing units retaining their constituent 
powers, as elaborated, among others, by 
Vincent Ostrom (1987). In Asia, a few very 
large, overpopulated empires have also 
escaped from the project of statization: China, 
the compound India-Pakistan-Bangladesh, as 
well as Indonesia and Japan, have maintained 
certain traditional imperial characteristics of 
internal complexity, not adopting the homog-
enizing features typical of modern European 
states.
Unlike in either North America or Asia, 
attempts to replicate the typical European 
‘state’ form of government were made in 
Hispanic America, Africa and the Middle 
East as a consequence of the colonial expan-
sion of European states and the further inde-
pendence of their colonies. The experience 
has been much less successful than it was in 
the metropolis – in many cases, a failure 
indeed. Often the very idea of ‘state’ was 
frustrated since the new political units 
achieved neither internal monopoly nor exter-
nal sovereignty.
There are several accounts of failed states 
in the current world. The World Bank holds a 
permanently revised list of ‘fragile states’, 
called LICUS (for ‘low income countries 
under stress’), to be given priority, but in 
most cases impotent foreign aid. There are 
between 30 and 40 of these countries, includ-
ing ‘collapsed or failing states’, others in 
permanent internal conflict, encompassing 
all together between five and ten percent of 
the world’s population. In another compara-
ble report, Britain’s Department for 
International Development has named 46 
‘fragile states’ of concern (Cabinet Office, 
2005). Other periodical reports on fragile or 
failed states are produced by the OECD (n. 
d.), the CIA (2000), and Fund for Peace and 
Foreign Policy (2005). The failure of state-
hood as an explanation for social disorder 
and economic stagnation is not, however, 
very frequent and, when used, it is typically 
within a teleological framework by which 
state-building is presented as the only possi-
ble model for non-European countries (as in 
Fukuyama, 2004).
Small is democratic
In recent worldwide developments, classical 
state-building under the Western European 
model has been largely replaced with a prolif-
eration of small countries, most of which do 
not brandish some essential elements of ‘sov-
ereignty’. While there were only about 50 
independent countries in the world at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, there are 
about 200 members of the United Nations in 
the early twenty-first century. They include 
about 70 mini-states with a population between 
one and ten million inhabitants and 40 micro-
states with less than one million inhabitants 
(among them most members of the European 
Union). In addition, there are more than 
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500 non-state political units with governments 
and legislative powers located within a couple 
of dozen vast federations or decentralized 
‘empires’. There are also about 20 ‘territories’ 
formally linked but physically non-contiguous 
to some large empire or state and in fact quite 
independent, and about 15 other territories de 
facto seceded from recognized states. Helpful 
data are provided by Kristian S. Gleditsch and 
Michael D. Ward (2007) and by the Correlates 
of War (n. d.) project at the University of 
Michigan. A good collection of cases of states 
in process of separation can be found in 
Bahcheli et al. (2004).
The increase in the number of independent 
countries and the corresponding decrease in 
their size, as well as the concurrent decen-
tralization of large states and empires, have 
accompanied the recent spread of democracy 
in the world. Contrary to some conventional 
knowledge, democracy does not require sov-
ereign statehood. It can be argued that some 
lively forms of ‘democracy’ in the sense of 
open elections and control of rulers by broad 
layers of citizens existed in old small commu-
nities, cities, nations and republics not invested 
with the attribute of sovereignty, long before 
the notion of state was even invented. Likewise, 
there are also nowadays several hundred dem-
ocratic, but non-sovereign local and regional 
governments within large states or empires.
As discussed in the seminal work by Robert 
A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte (1973), small 
communities can be more appropriate than 
large and populous territories for democratic 
forms of self-government. Their advantages 
can be found in each of the three stages of the 
decision process: deliberation, aggregation 
and enforcement. In a small community, 
people have more opportunities to gain knowl-
edge for collective decisions by direct obser-
vation and experience; thanks to territorial 
proximity, people can also deal more directly 
with political leaders; the latter can easily gain 
information about people’s demands and 
expectations by direct communication. Since 
a small community tends, in general, to be 
relatively homogeneous in terms of both eco-
nomic and ethnic variables, people may also 
have relatively harmonious interests, shared 
values and a common culture, which may 
make it easier to identify priority public goods 
and make collective decisions that are gener-
ally acceptable. Finally, small communities 
are more likely to generate loyalty; people will 
tend to comply with collective rules and deci-
sions, while leaders may be more responsive 
regarding their own decisions and activity.
Looking at the question from the other side, 
the disadvantages large unitary states have in 
establishing a democracy able to satisfy the 
preferences of a large majority of its citizens 
are not difficult to identify. Within a large 
political unit, different interests, values and 
opinions are likely to exist among the citizens. 
A collective decision made on a set of differ-
ent policy issues in bloc is likely to produce a 
high number of losers. Local majorities may 
become state-wide minorities and see their 
preferences rejected from binding collective 
decisions. In large and heterogeneous com-
munities, there is likely to be a group of abso-
lute winners, whose endurance may induce 
the losers either to resist the enforceability of 
collective decisions, not comply with them, 
rebel, secede or emigrate. In the extreme, dic-
tatorships are more likely to emerge and tri-
umph in very large political units or in highly 
heterogeneous ones.
The correlation between small size and 
democracy is empirically consistent, since the 
creation of increasingly numerous, smaller 
countries has accompanied the spread of demo-
cratic regimes. At the beginning of the twenty-
first century, there is democracy in all recognized 
micro-countries with less than 300,000 inhab-
itants, in more than two thirds of those with 
less than one million inhabitants (including 
the former group), and in more than one half of 
all small countries with less than 10 million 
inhabitants (including the two former groups), 
while only one third of large countries with 
more than 10 million inhabitants enjoy demo-
cratic regimes (specifically, there is democracy 
in 59 of the 112 smaller countries, but in only 
30 of the 86 larger countries). In other words, 
the number of small democracies is twice the 
number of large democracies.
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The rates of success in democratization are 
even higher for small communities within 
large federations. Nowadays, of all the large 
countries in the world with more than 10 mil-
lion inhabitants, those with a federal structure 
are democratic in almost three-fourths of the 
cases, while in large centralized and unitary 
states, democracy only exists in one-fourth of 
the cases (specifically, there is democracy in 
13 of 18 large federal countries, but in only 17 
of 68 large centralized states).
Bringing the empire back in
The increase in the number of viable small 
democratic governments seems to rely upon 
membership to very large areas of ‘imperial’ 
size, which provide public goods such as 
defense, security, trade agreements, common 
currencies and communication networks. 
Precisely because they do not have to pay the 
heavy burdens of classical statehood and sover-
eignty, including a costly army and a single 
currency, small countries in an open interna-
tional environment can benefit from their inter-
nal homogeneity and inclination to democracy. 
Within efficient, internally varied vast empires, 
small nations are now viable and, at the same 
time, better fit than large, heterogeneous states 
for democratic self-government.
A few vast empires do exist in the current 
world, including democratic and market-
oriented empires, such as the USA, the 
European Union, India and Japan, as well as 
China and Russia, just to mention the most 
prominent ones. An ‘empire’ can be conceived 
as a very large size polity with a government 
formed by multiple institutional levels and 
overlapping jurisdictions. In this sense, 
‘empire’ is an alternative formula to ‘state’, 
which can also be dictatorial or democratic or 
something in between, but is founded on fixed 
boundaries, external sovereignty and the aim 
of internal homogenization. Empires typically 
encompass a high number of small political 
units, including states, but also regions, cities 
and other communities, with different institu-
tional formulas across the territory.
Empire-wide political and institutional 
processes indeed disappeared from the field 
of academic political studies after the Second 
World War. A search in the American Political 
Science Review (APSR) since its foundation 
gives the following results. In the first period, 
from 1903–1949, as many as seven articles 
and 74 books reviewed included the words 
‘empire’ or ‘imperial’ in the title. Most of 
them dealt with the ‘problems and possibili-
ties’ (as titled in one of the reviews) of the 
British empire, followed by the German 
empire, as well as the American, Chinese, 
Japanese and Ottoman empires. Articles and 
books approached such suggestive subjects 
as empire’s unity, nationalism, federalism, 
government and politics, political system, 
governance, constitution and laws, legislative 
jurisdiction, administrative system, civil 
service or civil code – that is, the same kind 
of subjects that can be studied under the 
alternative framework of ‘state’.
In contrast, not a single piece of work pub-
lished in the APSR between 1950–1967 
included the words ‘empire’ or ‘imperial’ in 
the title. This suggests that ‘society-centered’ 
approaches which were prevalent during that 
period, at the same time that they neglected 
the study of states also forgot the study of 
empires. Since 1968, the words ‘empire’ or 
‘imperial’ reappear, although only in 40 book 
reviews, not in the titles of full-fledged arti-
cles. Most of the reviews in this period focus 
on history of past colonial empires, while 
only eight address imperial relations in the 
current world (mainly regarding American 
foreign affairs).
A new source of interest in the concept of 
empire can be derived, however, from state-
centered studies in state-building and nation-
building. Two generations of political scientists 
ago, some fundamental discussion was col-
lected by S. N. Eisendstadt and Stein Rokkan 
(1973). As they were embedded in the ‘mod-
ernization’ paradigm, the editors acknowl-
edged they had not been capable of ‘developing 
a general theoretical structure for comparisons 
across all regions of the world’, but remarked 
on ‘the uniqueness of the Western experience 
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of state formation and nation-building’ and its 
inappropriateness for the ‘Third World’. 
Specifically for Africa, for instance, ‘nation-
building in the European style was a luxury 
when not a catastrophe’.
Somehow following or paralleling this 
intuition, a number of historians have identi-
fied spatial and temporal limits for the valid-
ity of the concept of ‘state’: basically Western 
Europe and a few of its colonies since mid-
seventeenth century to late twentieth century. 
A masterful survey of the modern states in 
this perspective is given, for example, by 
Martin L. Van Creveld (1999). Other enlight-
ening studies on the formation of early states 
include William Doyle (1978), Charles Tilly 
(1975), Hendrik Spruyt (1994) and Philip 
Bobbitt (2002). The importance of initial 
violence, force and coercion in building a 
state has been particularly highlighted by 
social historian Charles Tilly, who went so 
far as to present both war-making and state-
making as forms of ‘organized crime’ (Tilly, 
1985). In the academic headquarters of polit-
ical science more strictly defined, the role of 
violence and coercion in the formation of 
states has also been stressed by Margaret 
Levi (1988; 1997) and Robert H. Bates 
(2001). Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum 
(1983) remarked that the state is but one pos-
sible institutional formula in complex socie-
ties in the modern world. The failure of the 
state model beyond Europe was subsequently 
analyzed also by Bertrand Badie (1992).
States, nations and empires
A few works dealing more directly with 
political and governmental processes in 
empires can also be mentioned. Specifically, 
‘the concept of empire’ and its potential in the 
analysis of long term historical periods was 
discussed in an excellent book co-authored by 
an outstanding selection of historians and 
political scientists at the initiative of Maurice 
Duverger (1980a).
More recently, Samuel E. Finer provided 
the only political science-oriented history of 
government in the world that goes beyond the 
last 200 years (Finer, 1997). Finer states at the 
very first page of his impressive, indispensa-
ble and irregular three volume study that his 
‘concern is with states’. However, he immedi-
ately acknowledges that most ‘pre-modern’ 
polities did not fulfill the basic characteristics 
of ‘state’, namely the notion of territorial 
sovereignty (and far less that of ‘a self-
consciousness of nationality’). Actually in his 
own ‘conceptual prologue’, Finer goes to pro-
vide a three-fold typology of structures of 
government based on the distinction between 
city, state and empire. In his extensive survey, 
the category of city-republics includes a 
number of cases in Mesopotamia, the poleis of 
Greece and medieval Europe. The ‘formation 
of the “modern European state”’, in turn, 
‘starts effectively with, and is built around, the 
erection of known frontiers … States were the 
product either of aggregation from small ter-
ritorial units or of the disaggregation of large 
territorial units’, according to Finer (1997: 9, 
35). But it can also be argued that, in the cur-
rent world, the states themselves are suffering 
processes of both disaggregation into small 
polities (along the revived tradition of city-
republics) and aggregation into large territo-
rial units of imperial size.
In fact, most of Finer’s work deals with 
empires, using regularly and explicitly the 
word. Specifically his analysis includes Assyria, 
‘the first empire in our modern sense’; Persia, 
‘the first secular-minded empire’; China, in fact 
a series of ‘multi-state empires’; Rome, which 
ruled through ‘imperial agents’ like the provin-
cial governors; the Byzantine empire; the Arab 
empire of the Caliphate; the Ottoman empire; 
and the Indian empires. Finer’s work provides, 
thus, highly valuable material for political sci-
ence analysis of polities or structures of govern-
ment through history, although his initial 
emphasis on ‘states’ is dismissed by his own 
substantive analysis of really existing govern-
ments. Other interesting suggestion for further 
work from Finer’s materials can be found in 
George E. Von der Muhll (2003).
Regarding current configurations, the 
European Union has also been analyzed as an 
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‘empire’ or at least as an empire under con-
struction. The European Union is indeed a 
very large political unit (the third in popula-
tion in the current world), it has expanded 
continuously outward without previously 
established territorial limits, it is organized 
diversely across the territory and has multiple, 
overlapping institutional levels of governance. 
The point that the European Union may not be 
‘unique’, ‘exceptional’ or ‘unprecedented’, as 
frequently asserted in certain journalistic lit-
erature and political speech, was addressed, 
for instance, by Caporaso et al. (1997). For a 
social scientist this only means that we are not 
using a sufficiently broad analytical concept 
capable of including this case among those 
with common relevant characteristics, such as 
that of ‘empire’. A comparison between the 
processes of constitutional building of the 
European Union and of the US was sketched 
by Richard Bellamy (2005). The war motives 
in building large empires like the European 
one were remarked by William H. Riker 
(1987; 1996). The vision of the European 
Union as a new kind of empire was suggested 
by Robert Cooper (2003). Europe ‘as an 
empire’ has been elaborated in parallel works 
by Jan Zielonka (2006) and Josep M. Colomer 
(2006; 2007a).
In the long-term there has been an ever-
continuing historical trend toward larger 
empires. The size and evolution of empires 
have been studied in four illuminating articles 
by Rein Taagepera (1978a; 1978b; 1979; 
1997), which are largely based on data in 
Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones (1978). 
According to these data, there is no evidence 
of empires larger than 10,000 km2 much 
before 3000 BC. The largest ancient empires, 
in Egypt and Mesopotamia, with about one 
million km2, were still tiny compared to the 
present ones. The largest ones at the beginning 
of our era, in China and Rome, were already 
much larger, with about five million km2. But 
modern empires, including Russia and the 
colonial empires of Spain and Britain, have 
encompassed double-digit millions of km2.
Another historical trend is towards an 
increasing number of simultaneous empires, 
so that the imperial form of government 
includes increasingly higher proportions of 
the world’s population. Virtually none of the 
territories of the currently existing states in 
the world has been alien or outside some 
large modern empire. Among the very few 
exceptions are Thailand (which emerged 
from the old kingdom of Siam without 
Western colonization) and Israel (which was 
created from scratch in 1948). But a world’s 
single-government is not foreseeable from 
historical developments. If the tendency 
toward increasingly larger sizes of empire, as 
measured by territory, is extrapolated, we 
find only a 50 per cent probability of a single 
world empire by a date placed between 2200 
and 3800 (depending on the author making 
the calculation). If the extrapolation is based 
on the proportion of the world’s population 
within the largest empire, that expectation 
should be deferred to nothing less than the 
year 4300.
A relevant implication of all this discussion 
is that, contrary to a still common assumption 
inspiring the US and other great empires’ for-
eign policy, especially regarding the Arab 
region and the Middle East, democracy does 
not require nation-state building. In ethnically 
highly heterogeneous countries, federal-type 
structures and the establishment of large-size 
areas of free trade and military and security 
cooperation, can work rather well. Even more: 
if sovereign units were strengthened in isola-
tion from each other, a higher degree of state-
ness could, paradoxically, jeopardize the 
chances of freedom and democracy, since it 
might revive or foster inter-state rivalries and 
mutually hostile relations.
THE CHOICE OF INSTITUTIONS
Within established communities, the design-
ers of institutions will aim at anticipating 
collective decisions on government and 
policy. Two types of decisions on institutions 
are reviewed in the following. First, those to 
regulate the division of powers among the 
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various branches of government, and second, 
those to define the relationships between 
these and the public, which in democracy are 
based on elections (Colomer, 2001b).
Division of powers
In the old legalistic approach to institutional 
design, democratic regimes were basically 
distinguished as ‘parliamentary’ or ‘presi-
dential’ depending on the relations between 
the legislative and the executive, as shown, 
for example, in the compilation by Arend 
Lijphart (1992). In parliamentary regimes 
there is fusion of powers between the parlia-
ment’s political majority and the cabinet. But 
by the early twentieth century, the develop-
ment of political parties was usually inter-
preted as a force eroding the central role of 
the parliament, up to the point to label the 
British model rather than ‘parliamentary’, a 
‘cabinet’ regime. However, it has more 
recently been remarked that the growth of 
party was instrumental to reduce the influ-
ence of the monarch but not necessarily that 
of the parliament. With the reduction of the 
monarch to a figurehead, the prime minister 
has indeed become the new one-person rele-
vant figure, but the position of the cabinet has 
weakened. In contrast, the role of parliament 
has survived, and even, in a modest way, 
thrived. At least regarding Britain, despite 
long-standing concerns regarding the balance 
of power, ‘parliament has always remained 
the primary institution of the polity’, accord-
ing to Matthew Flinders (2002; see also 
Bogdanor, 2003).
In the so-called ‘presidential’ regime, orig-
inated with the 1787 constitution of the US, 
there are separate elections for the assembly 
and the presidency and a complex system of 
‘checks and balances’ or mutual controls 
between institutions. They include term 
limits for the president, limited presidential 
veto of congressional legislation, senate rules 
permitting a qualified minority to block deci-
sions, senatorial ratification of presidential 
appointments, congressional appointment of 
officers and control of administrative agen-
cies, congressional impeachment of the pres-
ident, and judicial revision of legislation.
Recent analyses have formally shown how 
these counter-weighting mechanisms play in 
favor of power sharing between institutions 
and as equivalent devices to super-majority 
rules for decision-making. The obstacles 
introduced by the numerous institutional 
checks may stabilize socially inefficient 
status-quo policies, but they also guarantee 
that the most important decisions are made 
by broad majorities able to prevent the impo-
sition of a small or minority group’s will. 
With similar analytical insight but a different 
evaluation, other analyses have remarked that 
separate elections and divided governments 
create a ‘dual legitimacy’ prone to ‘dead-
lock’, that is, legislative paralysis and inter-
institutional conflict. A seminal contribution, 
based on a formal model for the United 
States constitution, showed how the interac-
tion of separate institutional bodies is likely 
to produce stable policy outcomes, as by 
Thomas Hammond and Gary Miller (1987). 
Further discussion includes contributions by 
Fred Riggs (1988), Juan J. Linz (1990a; b), 
William H. Riker (1992), Kenneth Krehbiel 
(1996; 1998), Robert A. Dahl (2002), José A. 
Cheibub and Fernando Limongi (2002), 
Josep M. Colomer (2005b).
A variant of political regime with separate 
elections for the presidency and the assembly, 
better called ‘presidentialism’, was estab-
lished in almost all republics in Latin America 
since the mid- or late- nineteenth century. 
Some founding constitution-makers in these 
countries claimed to be imitating the US con-
stitution, but, in contrast to the preventions 
against one-person’s expedient decisions 
introduced in the US, some of them looked 
farther back to the absolutist monarchies pre-
ceding division of powers and mixed regimes 
and aimed at having ‘elected kings with 
the name of presidents’ (in Simón Bolívar’s 
words). The distinction between US-style 
checks-and-balances, unified government in 
presidential regimes, and the more concen-
trated formula of ‘presidentialism’ can be 
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referred to Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton, 
respectively, according to James Burns 
(1965).
Presidential dominance has been attempted 
in Latin American countries through the presi-
dent’s veto power over legislation and his con-
trol of the army, which also exist in the US, 
supplemented with long presidential terms and 
re-elections, unconstrained powers to appoint 
and remove members of cabinet and other 
high officers, legislative initiative, capacity to 
dictate legislative decrees, fiscal and adminis-
trative authority, discretionary emergency 
powers, suspension of constitutional guarantees 
and, in formally federal countries, the right to 
intervene in state affairs. The other side of this 
same coin is weak congresses, which are not 
usually given control over the cabinet and are 
frequently constrained by short session periods 
and lack of resources. Recent discussion 
includes Matthew S. Shugart and John M. 
Carey (1992), Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela 
(1994), Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif 
(2002). Actually the Latin American model of 
presidential dominance has gained the lowest 
reputation among scholars and has been pro-
posed to be replaced with all the other regime 
types, including semi-parliamentarism by 
Carlos S. Nino (1992), Westminster features by 
Scott Mainwairing and Matthew S. Shugart 
(1997), US-style checks and balances by Bruce 
Ackerman (2000), and multiparty parliamen-
tarism by Josep M. Colomer and Gabriel L. 
Negretto (2005).
Another variant, usually called ‘semi-presi-
dential’ regime, but also ‘semi-parliamentary’, 
‘premier-presidential’ or ‘dual-executive’, was 
consistently shaped with the 1958 constitution 
of France. With this formula, the presidency 
and the assembly are elected separately, like in 
a checks-and-balances regime, but it is the 
assembly that appoints and can dismiss a 
prime minister, like in a parliamentary regime. 
The president and the prime minister share the 
executive powers in a ‘governmental diarchy’, 
as early stated by Maurice Duverger (1970; 
1978; 1980b).
At the beginning of the French experience, 
Duverger speculated that this constitutional 
model would produce an alternation between 
presidential and parliamentary phases, 
respectively favoring the president and the 
prime minister as dominant figure. The first 
phase of the alternation was indeed con-
firmed with presidents enjoying a compact 
party majority in the assembly. In these situ-
ations, ‘the president can become more pow-
erful than in the classical presidential 
regimes’, as well as more powerful than the 
British-style prime minister because he accu-
mulates the latter’s powers plus those of the 
monarch.
The second, parliamentary phase was, in 
contrast, not confirmed, since, even if the 
president faces a prime minister, a cabinet 
and an assembly majority with a different 
political orientation, he usually retains sig-
nificant powers, including the dissolution of 
the assembly, as well as partial vetoes over 
legislation and executive appointments, 
among others, depending on specific rules in 
each country. This makes the president cer-
tainly more powerful than any monarch or 
republican president in a parliamentary 
regime, as acknowledged by Duverger him-
self (1986; 1996; 1998). The French call this 
‘cohabitation’. There can, thus, be indeed 
two ‘phases’, depending on whether the 
president’s party has a majority in the assem-
bly and can appoint the primer minister or 
not; however, the two phases are not properly 
presidential and parliamentary, but they 
rather produce an even higher concentration 
of power than in a presidential regime and a 
dual executive, respectively. See also discus-
sion in Bahro et al. (1998), Giovanni Sartori 
(1994), Robert Elgie (1999).
Political regime performances
The introduction of a second dimension, the 
electoral system, makes the problems for 
institutional design of democratic regimes 
more complex. In particular, within parlia-
mentary regimes one can choose either 
majoritarian electoral rules, which typically 
imply that a single party will be able to win 
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an assembly majority and appoint the prime 
minister, or proportional representation rules, 
which correspond to multi-party systems 
and coalition cabinets. Presidential regimes 
and their variants, in contrast, are less affected 
by the electoral system dimension since at 
least one of the systems, the one for the elec-
tion of the president, must be majoritarian 
and produce a single absolute winner.
Different institutional choices have been 
linked to different rates of success in attempts 
of democratization and in the duration of 
democratic regimes. In order to understand 
some results, it may be convenient to think 
again about the stylized assumption that stra-
tegic choices of different institutional formu-
las tend to be driven by actors’ relative 
bargaining strength, electoral expectations, 
and attitudes to risk. It is logical to expect 
that citizens and political leaders will tend to 
support those formulas producing satisfac-
tory results for themselves and reject those 
making them permanently excluded and 
defeated. As a consequence, institutional 
formulas producing widely distributed satis-
factory outcomes can be more able to develop 
endogenous support and endure. Widely rep-
resentative and effective political outcomes 
can feed social support for the corresponding 
institutions, while exclusionary, biased, arbi-
trary, or ineffective outcomes might foster 
citizens’ and leaders’ rejection of the institu-
tions producing such results.
Generally, constitutional democracies 
favoring power-sharing and inclusiveness 
should, thus, be able to obtain higher endog-
enous support and have greater longevity 
than those favoring the concentration of 
power. Empirical accounts show that demo-
cratic regimes are the most peaceful ones, 
while semi-democratic or transitional regimes 
are most prone to conflict, even more than 
exclusionary dictatorships (basically because 
the latter increase the costs of rebellion). 
Among democracies, parliamentary regimes 
are more resilient to crises and more able to 
endure than presidential ones (Stepan and 
Skach, 1993). But parliamentary regimes 
with majoritarian electoral systems appear to 
be associated to higher frequency of ethnic 
and civil wars than presidential regimes, 
while parliamentary regimes with propor-
tional representation are the most peaceful 
ones (Reynal-Querol, 2002). Updated calcu-
lations show that of all attempts to establish 
a democratic regime in countries with more 
than one million inhabitants since the nine-
teenth century, those having initially adopted 
the British model of parliamentarism with 
majoritarian electoral rule have survived only 
in 37 per cent of the cases, while the rate of 
success for presidential and semi-presidential 
regimes is 54 per cent (with high variance in 
duration), and for parliamentarism with pro-
portional representation, of 72 per cent 
(Colomer, 2001a; 2007a).
Electoral rules
Electoral system design requires major 
choices between indirect elections, direct 
elections by majority rule, mixed systems, 
and proportional representation. Regarding 
the strategies of political parties to design 
electoral systems, in general the ‘Micro-
mega rule’ applies: the large prefer the small 
and the small prefer the large (‘Micro-mega’ 
is the title of Voltaire’s tale in which dwarfs 
and giants dialogue). Specifically, dominant 
and large parties prefer single-member dis-
tricts with majoritarian rules able to exclude 
others from competition, while multiple 
small parties prefer large districts with pro-
portional representation rules able to include 
them. Thus, political configurations in which 
there is a single dominant party or two rather 
balanced parties tend to produce choices in 
favor of rather restrictive or exclusionary 
electoral systems, such as those based on the 
majority principle, while pluralistic settings 
with multiple parties tend to favor choices in 
favor of more inclusive electoral formulas, 
such as those using rules of proportional rep-
resentation.
Maurice Duverger (1951) already noted that 
‘the first effect of proportionality is to main-
tain an already existing multiplicity … On the 
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whole, proportional representation maintains 
virtually without change the party system exist-
ing at the time of its adoption’, although he did 
not elaborate. Precisely in a book review of 
Duverger, John G. Grumm remarked:
the generally-held conclusions regarding the causal 
relationships between electoral systems and party 
systems might well be revised. … it may be more 
accurate to conclude that proportional representa-
tion is a result rather than a cause of the party 
system in a given country (Grumm, 1958: 375).
Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan also 
suggested that electoral systems should be 
treated as the result of institutional choices 
by political actors: ‘In most cases it makes 
little sense to treat electoral systems as inde-
pendent variables. The party strategists will 
generally have decisive influence on elec-
toral legislation and opt for the system of 
aggregation most likely to consolidate their 
position’ (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). More 
recently, analytical models, surveys and dis-
cussion on electoral system design and choice 
have been provided by Arend Lijphart and 
Bernard Grofman (1988), Carles Boix (1999), 
Josep M. Colomer (2004), Pippa Norris 
(2004), Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell 
(2005), and Kenneth Benoit (2007).
It seems reasonable to assume that, under 
restrictive formulas such as majority rule, 
political actors facing the effects of their own 
failure at coordinating themselves into a 
small number of candidacies and the emer-
gence of new issues and new contenders for 
seats and offices, may shift to prefer electoral 
institutions able to reduce the risks of com-
peting by giving all participants higher 
opportunities to obtain or share power. When 
there are only a few parties, they can be satis-
fied with majoritarian electoral systems, but 
when the number and the size of new parties 
increase, the incumbent parties may begin to 
fear the risk of becoming absolute losers and 
try to shift to more inclusive electoral formu-
las. Electoral system changes indeed tend to 
move overwhelmingly in favor of increas-
ingly inclusive, less risky formulas: from 
indirect to direct elections, from unanimity to 
majority rules, and from the latter to mixed 
systems and to proportional representation 
(Colomer, 2004; see also Blais and Massicotte, 
1997; Lijphart, 1994).
Existing parties tend, thus, to choose elec-
toral systems able to crystallize or consolidate 
the previously existing party configurations 
and systems. Only in large countries with 
large assemblies, limited voters’ participation, 
and successful coordination in two large par-
ties, single-member districts and plurality rule 
remain stable as an equilibrium institutional 
formula. In the US, in particular, in spite of 
being a very large and heterogeneous country, 
each representative is elected by the rather 
homogeneous population of a small territory 
in a way that the two main nation-wide parties 
become large-tents or umbrellas of varied 
representation.
Since the nineteenth century, we can count 
82 major changes of assembly electoral 
system in 41 countries with more than one 
million inhabitants. In consistency with the 
discussion above, we observe that more than 
80 per cent of these changes have been in the 
direction toward more inclusive formulas. 
Specifically, indirect assembly elections 
decreased and virtually disappeared in the 
early twentieth century. Majority rule, which 
was the basic formula in the few democratic 
countries existing in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, was replaced in its 
appeal by proportional representation, espe-
cially after the First World War. This trend 
has intensified in recent processes of democ-
ratization. Mixed systems have spread widely 
in the most recent period, mostly as a result 
of changes from non-democratic regimes or 
plurality rule. Nowadays, most democratic 
countries with more than one million inhabit-
ants use electoral systems with proportional 
representation rules.
Likewise, we can count 28 major changes 
of presidential electoral rules in 14 countries, 
mostly moving from electoral college to 
simple plurality rule and to second-round for-
mulas based on qualified-plurality or absolute 
majority rules, the latter permitting multiparty 
competition at the first round. This trend is 
stronger during present democratic periods. 
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More specifically, it has been proven that 
while dominant and large parties are likely to 
choose simple plurality rule, small parties are 
likely to choose variants of majority rule with 
second round runoff, a system which permits 
broader participation and coalition formation 
in support of the two leading candidates. This 
hypothesis has been supported by a statistical 
analysis of the determinants of electoral choice 
in 49 cases of major and minor constitutional 
changes in Latin American countries by 
Gabriel L. Negretto (2006).
Large (small) assemblies, 
small (large) districts
An example of how the analysis of inter-
institutional relations and institutional 
choices can be operationalized for quantita-
tively measurable variables and further 
empirical test is the following. Rein Taagepera 
(2001; 2007), by deductive reasoning, has 
presented a formula between basic elements 
of the electoral system, the district magni-
tude, M, the number of seats or size of the 
assembly, S, and the number of parliamen-
tary parties, P, by which: P = (MS)1/4. His 
initial intention was to explain the number of 
parties as derived from the electoral system. 
But his own formula also permits to analyze 
the relation the other way round, that is, the 
electoral system as derived from the number 
of parties. More clearly, it is: M = P4/S.
In a previous work, Rein Taagepera and 
Mathhew S. Shugart had established that the 
size of the assembly, S, depends on the size 
of the country in terms of population, C, 
approaching S = C 1/3 (Taagepera and Shugart, 
1989). Now we can see in the above formula 
that the larger the country, and hence the 
larger the assembly, S, the smaller the 
expected district magnitude, M. Very large 
countries, precisely because they have large 
assemblies, can stay associated to small sin-
gle-member districts. With similar number of 
parties, the institutional designers in India, 
for example, are likely to choose single-
member districts, while the institutional 
designers in Estonia are likely to choose mul-
timember districts, typically associated to 
proportional representation rules.
In separate work, I myself hypothesized 
that electoral systems based on single-member 
districts and majority rule would be estab-
lished and maintained when the effective 
number of parties lies between one and four, 
that is, when a single party may have or expect 
to have an absolute majority. Beyond four 
effective parties, the parties may want to 
change the electoral system to introduce mul-
timember electoral districts with proportional 
representation rules. The hypothesis was sup-
ported with empirical data for 70 countries 
showing that only when the number of effec-
tive parties increases to four, the probability 
of an electoral system change in favor of pro-
portional representation rises above half 
(Colomer, 2005a).
There is, thus, a great coincidence between 
the results of both the deductive and the 
inductive analyses just reported. The stylized 
approach focusing just on a few clearly 
defined, well measurable variables makes us 
realize that the pressures from multiparty 
systems to adopt inclusive electoral rules 
work differently in countries of different 
sizes. In large countries, a large assembly, 
whose number of seats is positively corre-
lated to the country’s population, can be 
elected in small, single-member districts. In 
small countries, by contrast, the size of the 
assembly is small and, as a consequence, the 
development of multiple parties favors more 
strongly the adoption of inclusive, large mul-
timember districts with rules of proportional 
representation. Thus we tend to see large 
assemblies with small districts, and small 
assemblies with large districts.
This may seem counter-intuitive, since 
apparently small countries should have more 
‘simple’ party configurations and less prob-
lems to identify a majority winner, so that 
they could work by simple electoral systems 
such as those with single-member districts 
and majority rule in acceptable ways (actu-
ally this tends to happen in very small and 
micro-countries with only a few hundred 
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thousand inhabitants in which no more than 
two parties emerge). If the relation between 
variables is clearly established and measured, 
we can have an answer to the intriguing ques-
tion of why large countries, including the US 
and other former British colonies, in spite of 
the fact that large size is typically associated 
to high heterogeneity, keep single-member 
districts and have not adopted proportional 
representation.
A relevant implication for institutional 
design is that if the size of the assembly is 
rather stable and depends on the country’s 
size, for a small country with a small assem-
bly, just a few parties are necessary to pro-
duce a change of electoral system in favor of 
proportional representation. In contrast, for a 
large country and a large assembly, many 
parties would be necessary to produce such a 
result, as discussed for the UK, after some 
failed attempts to reform the electoral rules, 
by Patrick Dunleavy (2005).
In the long-term, as we have seen in the 
first part of this chapter, both the number of 
countries and the number of democracies in 
the world are increasing, leading to an over-
all decrease in the size of the democratic 
countries. The size of democratic assemblies 
also decreases, since it is positively corre-
lated to the country’s population. As the 
number of parties increases within each 
democracy, more and more countries tend, 
thus, to adopt electoral systems with propor-
tional representation rules.
In large countries and empires, such as 
Australia, Canada, France, India, the UK and 
the US, a large assembly can be sufficiently 
inclusive, even if it is elected in small, single-
member districts, due to territorial variety of the 
representatives. In small countries, by contrast, 
the size of the assembly is small and, as a con-
sequence, the enlargement of voting rights, the 
broadening of the public agenda and develop-
ment of multiple parties favors more strongly 
the adoption of more inclusive, large multi-
member districts with proportional representa-
tion rules. Indeed, proportional representation 
began to be adopted for parliamentary elections 
in a few relatively small Western European 
countries in the early twentieth-century, as 
analyzed in several of the studies previously 
cited, and has widely spread among new 
democracies during the last decades.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is not unfounded to assume that the design of 
political institutions is usually driven by politi-
cians’ and would-be rulers’ ambition, the pur-
suit of power, and calculations, estimates or 
expectations about the likely consequences of 
different institutional formulas to favor design-
ers’ self-interest. However, as we have seen in 
the previous pages, the outcomes of such 
endeavors tend to be relatively favorable to 
formulas restricting the opportunities for high 
concentration of power and permitting broad 
satisfaction of people’s preferences and 
demands. Specifically, institutional choices 
during the last decades tend to produce small 
countries, more democracies, division of 
powers, and electoral rules favoring multiparty 
representation. In spite of, or precisely through 
actors’ self-interested behaviour, institutional 
choices seem to be guided by an ‘invisible 
hand’ favouring relatively acceptable solutions.
Of course, all of this is based on long-term 
tendencies and positively tested with only 
average values for large numbers of cases. 
For single-case analyses, several possible 
situations faced by self-interested political 
actors can be identified. If the distribution of 
power in a community is such that one single 
group is institutionally dominant and expects 
to be secure winner with the existing institu-
tional rules, these will not likely be changed – 
institutional stability can be expected. In 
contrast, situations more prone to institu-
tional change include those in which there is 
high uncertainty regarding the different 
groups’ relative strength and those in which 
new groups are emerging and gaining increas-
ing support among voters. For anticipated 
losers or threatened winners, institutional 
change can be a rational strategy if the 
expected advantages of alternative formulas 
balance the risks of keeping playing by the 
existing rules.
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We should take into account that many spe-
cific decisions and reforms are embedded in 
larger sets of institutional choices. Most promi-
nently, the introduction of universal suffrage 
and processes of democratization have been, 
already since the late nineteenth century and in 
further waves through the twentieth century, 
paramount occasions for incumbent rulers and 
challenging opposition groups to decrease the 
global costs of changing political institutions 
and deal with innovative rules and formulas. In 
general, self-interested actors may try to enlarge 
the opportunities to compete for power posi-
tions by creating multiple institutional levels 
submitted to elections, such as the separation of 
the presidency from the assembly, the embodi-
ment of regional governments or the creation of 
newly independent units.
But institutional decisions may entail some 
trade-offs between different levels and sets of 
rules. As we have seen, federalism or territo-
rial representation in large countries and 
empires with diverse population may work as 
a substitute for proportional representation by 
giving different homogeneous, territorially-
based groups opportunities to enter institu-
tions and, thus, preventing a major electoral 
reform. As another example, the introduction 
of direct presidential election may open a new 
opportunity for electoral contest, but it may 
also constrain the degree of multipartism in 
the assembly because it is always submitted to 
majority rule and thus fosters polarization. 
Specific analyses of institutional design proc-
esses need, thus, to place the question in the 
context of the global relationship of forces 
among the relevant political actors and take 
into account the exchanges in which they can 
enter on parallel settings for multiple choices.
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